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In general the Public Choice is presented in many macroeconomic's handbook as a modern 
economic school born during the '60s. However as point out by their founders James Buchanan, 
and Gordon  Tullock the Public Choice is more correctly defined as a multidisciplinary research 
program in political economy. The historical roots are traceable on the studies developed by the 
Italian schoolers of Public Finance.  
The original objective of the Public Choice is investigate the political aspect adopting the 
economic instruments. These phenomena although have economic relevance are not explained by 
the market mechanism; this field of research  was traditionally investigated by the sociologist and 
political scientists.  
James Buchanan starts from a quantitative observable consideration: after the II World War 
one-third of the national product, more or less, was deducted by the market force. Thus it is evident 
the raising importance of these aspects on the economy, both in direct than in indirect terms. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the Keynesian policy, imposes a new challenge for the economists 
which want to explain the dynamics of this phenomenon; starting from the assumption that the 
quantity and the quality of public spending is decided by political reasons, appear evident that the 
Neoclassical theoretical framework which is focused on the general equilibrium proposed by Walras 
and Pareto is inadequate for explain the cycle of the public spending. 
In a similar context the needs of a new explanatory model pushed two eminent scholars as 
Buchanan and Tullock to start a new research program. The objective is analyze what happen 
during the decisional process in the black-box denominated state. The classical The Calculus of 
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy published in 1963, by Buchanan and 
Tullock, which is considered the pillar of the Public Choice theory contains lot of the successive 
themes which are developed during decades1. The authors start from the assumption that the 
decisions of the government are part of the economy and not exogenous respect its. Thus, the 
choices and the commons actions must be studied as part of the study on the public sector.  
However, it is useful remember that the future developments of Public Choice has gone over the 
objectives of the proponents, revolutionizing the study of democratic decision-making processes.
To this end, a first important distinction stressed by Buchanan, regard the constitution and 
the ordinary law, the emphasis on this aspect is not motived by Jurisprudential and technical 
reasons, but from the attempt to understand the institutional context and the space of possible 
alternatives. In my opinion this is a relevant aspect because it contributes to move the attention of 
the economist on the institutional aspects, which are in general underestimate by the economists in 
particular by the Keynesian framework which adopt the aggregation with a great degree  of 
approximation. Furthermore,  in  my  opinion  the develop of the researches in this direction 
represented an important catalyst for the birth of another orthodox approach: the New Institutional 
Economy2. 
Regarding the relation between the decisional process and the democracy, the interrogative that 
1 Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan, G. Tullock –  The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, 
1962. 
2 Cfr.: O. E. Williamson –  The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead –  Journal of Economic 
Literature Vol. XXXVIII (September 2000) pp. 595–613.
Buchanan express in his article synthesizes the essence of a the Majority Rule: 
“If majority rule produces unjust and inefficient  outcomes, and if political stability is secured only 
by discrimination against minorities, how can democracy, as the organizing principle for political 
structure, possibly claim normative  legitimacy? ”3. 
The reply to this question is not trivial, Buchanan reporting the Wicksell's thought, suggest as the 
criteria of unanimity is perfect in theory, but not applicable to the contingent situations. 
It  is  useful  stress  the  differences  of Public Choice approach  respects to the traditional 
political  science;  the  public  choice  is  neutral  respect  to  the  Ethical  aspect, his  view  is  not 
influenced by the values, thus  the objective is not focused on the normative aspects, or  how the 
policy could be, but on the real functioning of public sector which represents the positive aspects. 
Thus the approach from a epistemological point of view is more similar to the natural science than 
to  the  social  science.  For these reasons the title of Buchanan’s  article is  “Politics without 
Romance”.   
In this context the politicians are considered as actors which have the objective of maximization of 
the personal interests; the Methodological Individualism which  is  a  theoretical  framework 
elaborated by Mills, represents another pillar of the Public Choice, although revised and extended as 
expressed by Buchanan:
“The  first  point  to  be  noted  is  that  economic  theory  does  not  depend  for  its  validity  or  its  
applicability on the presence of the purely economic man. This  man of fiction, who is motivated  
solely by individual self-interest in all aspects of his behavior, has always represented a caricature  
designed by those who have sought to criticize rather than to appreciate the genuine contribution  
that  economic  analysis  can  make,  and has  made,  toward a  better  understanding of  organized  
human  activity.  The  man  who  enters  the  market  relationship  as  consumer,  laborer,  seller  of  
products,  or  buyer  of  services  may  do  so  for  any  number  of  reasons.  The  theory  of  markets  
postulates only that the relationship be economic, that the interest of his opposite number in the  
exchange be excluded from consideration. Wicksteed's principle of "non-Tuism" is the appropriate  
one,  and his example of  Paul's  tent-making is  illustrative.  The accepted theory of  markets  can  
explain behavior and enable the economist to make certain meaningful predictions, so long as Paul  
does not take into account the interest of those for whom he works in repairing the tents. Paul may  
be acting out of love of God, the provincial church, friends, or self without affecting the operational  
validity of the theory of markets”4.
From the  arguments  mentioned  above,  emerge  as  the  Public  Choice  considers  the  politicians, 
rational actors leaded by egoistical interests, not oriented to promote the common interests, but the 
personal utility. 
A democratic government with their  delegates is  pushed by the citizen to  maximize his 
utility, for these reasons the Public Choice stress the attention on the decisional process, analyzing 
the interaction between different parts which represents contradictory interests. The central idea of 
the Public Choice is: 
How are collective decisions made?
 
The answer,  of course,  is  that the decisions are made by policymakers:  politicians, voters and 
bureaucrats. 
The starting idea of public choice theory is disarmingly simple: Individuals, when acting as voters, 
politicians,  or  bureaucrats,  continue to  be self-interested and try to maximize their  utility.  This 
convergence of interests is expressed by different roles.  
The great part of the public policy are managed by politicians, which are delegates. Because the 
3 Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan – Politics without Romance – Policy • Vol. 19 No. 3 • Spring 2003. p. 1-6
4 Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan, G. Tullock – Politics and the Economic Nexus – 1999. p. 1-12. 
constituency  is  in  general  related  to  a  territory,  the  candidates  are  incentivize  to  sustain  the 
programs and policies which catch advantages for his constituency, in particular when the policies 
are financed by the general imposition, which provide the illusion that the policy is “free” and so it 
is only the fruit of goodwill. The politicians are configured as individuals or parts in competition for 
the re-election, and for this reason are in general in search of votes through homogeneous groups 
well organized linked by common interests which are producer of consent. It is evident that the 
practice of logrolling accentuate these results, in many occasion. 
The  voters are the base of the democracy subjected to others peculiarities. Duncan Black 
(1908-1991) a Scottish economist is remembered for the introduction of  Median Voter Theorem, 
which demonstrate how in a election with three candidates or three coalitions, the median voters is 
the  decisive  element.  It  is  evident  that  in  a  bipartisan  system the  different  “wings”  which  are 
oriented to capture the great part of the centrist component tend to assimilate the programs. In other  
terms, the elections or the referendum not always produce a clear result, moreover except for the 
median voter, all voters are unhappy with the results.
This concept was recovered by the Public Choice and in particular by Buchanan, in his 
works5.
Moreover, appear evident as the voters are influenced by groups of interest, lobbies which act in 
order to influence the collective choices, because the action of a single individual is not enough to 
condition the general results.
The bureaucrats represents the third category of the democratic system, a obscure group 
with limited visibility and not  influenced by the political  events (not  elected).  It  represents the 
technocrat-structure, of the state, as the others previous category it tend to maximize his utility, with 
rational actions, such as the maximization of the size of bureaus' budget, the recruitment of new 
employees,  all  of  these  actions  tend  to  produce  a  increasing  of  costs  for  the  tax-payers.  The 
politicians  don't  know the  real  cost  of  production  of  the  bureaucrats, so  in  general  have  the 
tendency to be assertive respect to the requests presented by the bureaucrats. This theory is widely 
supported by a large number of studies showing that production costs in public bureaucracies are 
higher than in comparable private enterprises during the time6. 
what are the consequences ?
Respect to this phenomenon the  Public Choice introduced a important explanatory concept: the 
Rent Seeking7. This concept introduced originally by Gordon Tullock is configurable as a situation 
in  which  an  individual,  a  company  or  a  organization,  attempt  to  obtain  economic  rent by 
manipulating the social or political environment in which economic activities occur, rather than by 
creating new wealth. It is evident the lack of value added, for these reasons although this situation 
is particularly diffused in the political context, in my view is damaging the entire system.    
In extreme terms, a continuous expansion of the bureaucracies can provoke the failure of the state 
which is not enable to cover the spending.
what is the suggestion ?
A complete reformulation of the  state in economy which include the fixation of  constitutional 
limits to  the  budget  and  public  spending,  which  is  not  negotiable.  This  assumption  is  widely 
criticized by many economists included Murray Rothbard, which considers its a trivial defense of 
the status quo. Of Course, single aspects of the theoretical framework was criticized. Bart Engelen 
in  his  article  put  in  discussion  the  Homo Economics which  is  a  fundamental  concept  of  the 
Buchanan’s concept8. In particular he consider that the starting point is wrong because Buchanan, 
5 Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan - Politics without Romance - Policy • Vol. 19 No. 3 • Spring 2003. p. 1-6.
6 Cfr.: P. Lemieux - The Public Choice Revolution - Regulation, Fall 2004. p. 22-29.
7 Cfr.: G. Tullock - The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft - Western Economic Journal 5 (3) p. 224-232. 
1967. 
8 Cfr.: B. Engelen - Thinking Things Through: The Value and Limitations of James Buchanan’s Public Choice Theory  - 
Review of Political Economy, Volume 19, Number 2, April 2007. p. 165-179.
aiming  to  change  the  institutional  structure  as  it  exists  here  and now,  does  not  start  from the 
individual  as  he exists  here  and now. It  is  evident  that  the  adoption  of  Homo Economics  is  a 
empirical rather than methodological model, however the question is accentuated by the fact that 
Buchanan has himself consistently stressed the need for economics to accurately reflect reality and 
because  he  has  claimed  to  describe  individuals  realistically.  The  Great  part  of  Public  Choice 
theorists, as Buchanan starts from an inadequate conception of the individual and of the social, 
cultural  and  institutional  forces  constituent  his  identity.  This  is  exactly  why  his  constitutional 
project for improving the current structure of society appears not successful.
Another interesting observation and criticism regarding the Public Choice, was expressed by 
Caplan,  and  Stringham,  in his paper the authors stress the accent on the relation between the 
Public  Choice  and the  first  Austrian  School  (Mises,  Bastiat).  “While  traditional  public  choice  
generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-
Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded”9.  The authors 
remember as  Mises and  Bastiat anticipate many of the themes which are part of the criticisms 
directed to the Public Choice, in particular the behavior of the voters, and the rationality choice.  
In conclusion we can say that from the theory expressed in brief, appear evident as after the 
introduction of the Public Choice framework, the economics-policy is not the same, because this 
theoretical corpus, put in discussion great part of the  macroeconomics paradigms, in particular the 
assertion  deriving  from  the  Keynesian  Approach,  based  on  the  aggregate  as  unit  of  analysis. 
However is evident that even the criticisms have produced a rich flow of future researches in a 
sector which was not traditionally considered by the economists.  
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